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ESSAY

COPYRIGHT AS MYTH
Jessica Litman*

It has become fashionable to seek to formulate, or reformulate,
copyright law as an expression of overarching grand theory. Perhaps
the most prominent manifestation of this trend has been the recasting
of copyright law in the mold of economic incentives;1 a more recent
upstart competitor seeks to reclaim the debate by invoking the philosophical precepts of Hohfeld, Hegel and Locke.2 Occasionally, the literature gives us polite debates about which of the competing theoretical
models is more misguided. 3 Meanwhile, another voice in the copyright
• Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.A., 1974, Reed College; M.F.A., 1976,
Southern Methodist University; J.D., 1983, Columbia Law School. This essay is based on a paper
delivered at the Society for Critical Exchange Conference on Intellectual Property and the Construction of Authorship, at Case Western Reserve University on April 21, 1990. I am grateful to
Jonathan Weinberg, Avery Katz, Pamela Samuelson and Wendy Gordon for their helpful
comments.
l. See, e.g., l PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES. LAW AND PRACTICE 4-11 (1989);
Richard Adelstein & Steven Perez, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas:
Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 209 (1985);
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); John Cirace, When Does Complete Cop-

ying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other than Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use? An
Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. Louis U. LJ.
647 (1984); William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1659, 1698-1744 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325 (1989); Peter S. Mcnell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
2. E.g., Fisher, supra note l, at 1744-83; Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragem~nt Theory, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1343 (1989); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. LJ. 287
(1988); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532; Alfred C.
Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517
(1990); Symposium On Law and Philosophy, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 757 (1990).
3. E.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 8-9; Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights
Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
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literature has been complaining that the law is remarkably unaccommodating of the actual process of creating works of authorship.' The
resort to grand thepry does little to illuminate the reason why that
should be so.
The merits of the various competing theoretical models, and
whether those models' disregard for experiential data is a weakness or
a strength, could occupy many scholars for many months. This essay
seeks to focus on a very thin slice of that inquiry: Neither copyright
law, nor the models that seek to interpret it, seem to pay great attention to the process of authorship. Perhaps because the universe appreciates the aesthetics of symmetry, authors appear to return the favor by
paying little attention to the copyright law. 15 One would think that the
two realms scarcely overlapped for all the attention each receives from
the other. One might posit that copyright law is written by lawmakers
unfamiliar with the process of authorship and that authorship is committed by innocents unversed in the details of copyright. The hypothesis seems compelling if one has but slight acquaintance with both domains. Indeed, it is a - hypothesis that remains persuasive
notwithstanding that the copyright law was written not by lawmakers
or bureaucrats, but by authors and publishers and the people who represent them. 6 Although the community of industries that copyright
affects paid close attention to the provisions of the copyright law during
the long copyright revision process, individual authors and publishers
appear to have internalized the substance of those provisions not at all.7
PoL'Y 817 (1990); Yen, supra note 2, at 539-46.
4. E.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Law Steering the Right Course?, IEEE SOFTWARE, Sept. 1988, at 78; Pamela
Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Comparing the Views of Lawyers and User Interface Designers
on the Copyright "Laok and Feel" Lawsuits, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 121 (1989); Wendy J. Gordon,

Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 u. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1028-32 (1990) (reviewing PAUL GOLDSTEIN. COPYRIGHT,
PRINCIPLES. LAW AND PRACTICE (1989)); Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework/or Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 421 {1988); see also Janet E. Mosher, 20th Century Music:
The Impoverishment in Copyright Law of a Strategy of Forms, 5 INTELL. PROP. J. 51 (1989)
(Canadian law).
5. Throughout this essay, I use the word "author" in the copyright sense of anyone who
creates copyrightable works, whether they be books, songs, sculptures, buildings, computer programs, paintings or films.
6. See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857 {1987).
7. See infra note 15; see also infra note 27. Readers who are familiar with the intricacies of
the current copyright statute might consider, here, the behavior of the institutions that publish
their work.
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Parts I and II of this essay describe the prevailing public myth of
copyright, and contrast it with the legal regime set out in the statute
and case law. Part III points out that the theoretical literature about
copyright commonly assumes that authors are in fact aware of the
law's provisions and questions why authors cling to their own version of
the copyright law rather than the actual one. Parts IV and V suggest
that authors believe in the popular copyright myth, rather than the
copyright law, because the actual copyright law is less hospitable than
the myth to the authorship process. Authors necessarily incorporate
others' work into their own in the creative process, in ways that they
are not and cannot be aware of at the time. The copyright law, which
accords protection from the moment a work is fixed in tangible form
and forbids infringement from the infringing work's inception, might
stifle that process. The copyright myth, in contrast, presents no such
obstacle. Part VI, finally, suggests that theories of copyright divorced
from the reality of what authors believe have only limited value. Copyright scholars have been exploring theoretical models that seek to justify copyright in the abstract, but have not yet examined the affinity of
those models for the authors they seek to describe.
I.
Copyright law turns out to be tremendously counterintuitive; that
is why it is fun to teach it, and why it can be such a good substitute for
smalltalk and other species of cocktail party conversation. Part of the
reason that laypeople (by which I mean lawyers and non-lawyers and
authors and non-authors; indeed, everyone but the copyright specialist) 8
find copyright law hard to grasp could be its mind-numbing collection
of inconsistent, indeed incoherent, complexities. 9 But there seems to be
8. If one expected either people who made their living as authors or people trained in the
law to have an informed idea of the basics of copyright law, then one would expect professors of
law to be better informed on the topic than most. After years of conversations with many of my
former colleagues at the University of Michigan Law School, however, I concluded that the popular myth of how copyright law works, see text accompanying infra notes 12-13, is so firmly ingrained in the psyche that people who make their livings authoring copyrighted works, and possess
the legal training to investigate the myth, nonetheless seem unable to muster a vision of copyright
law that contradicts it. See also Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 353-55 (asserting, despite
statutory language and settled case law to the contrary, that copyright in a derivative work vests
in the author of the underlying work rather than the author of the derivative work).
9. For example, § 110(5) of the statute privileges the public playing of radio and television
broadcasts, but not of recorded music, in commercial establishments no larger than the Pittsburgh
delicatessen involved in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). See H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701.
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nothing inherent in the subject of law about copyright that should violate people's intuitions. Although writers have suggested that members
of the public find the idea of property rights in intangibles difficult to
accept, 10 there seems to be little evidence that members of the public
find the idea of a copyright counterintuitive.11 Rather, the lay public
seems to have a startlingly concrete idea of what copyright law is and
how it works. This popular idea, however, has little to do with actual
copyright law.
What is this public picture? My impression, distilled from some
years of teaching and conversations with lawyers and non-lawyers, is
that the general public's picture of the copyright system looks like this:
A creative person creates something-a book, or a song, or a painting.
If that person is especially protective of his rights, he can acquire a
copyright. To do this, he sends his creation to the Copyright Office in
Washington, which examines it to ascertain whether it is good enough.
If the people in the Copyright Office decide that it is sufficiently imaginative, and not duplicative of works that have been copyrighted in the
past, they will send him back a copyright. 12 He will then have "copyrighted" his work and will own a copyright in it. If, however, he doesn't
feel like going to the bother of copyrighting his work, he can instead
offer it, as yet uncopyrighted, to a publisher. The publisher will decide
whether it is good enough to publish, and if so, the publisher will take
care of sending it off to the Copyright Office to get it copyrighted. 13 In
Section 110(4) permits certain nonprofit performances of music and literature (but not drama)
under circumstances that seem designed to penalize the person who performs the work if she
should seek the copyright owner's permission. Other statutory privileges are even less straightforward. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
REV. 275 (1989).
10. Gordon, supra note 2, at 1345-48; see, e.g., Boudewijn Bouckaert, What is Property?,
13 HARV. JL. & Pus. PoL'Y, 775, 801-06 (1990); Dale A. Nance, Forward: Owning Ideas, 13
HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 758, 761-67, 770-73 (1990).
1I. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 121-23, 208-09 (1986); THE POLICY PLANNING GROUP. YANKELOVICH. SKELLY & WHITE. INC., PuBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE "IN•
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS" ISSUE (1985) (final report prepared for the Office of Technology
Assessment); THE POLICY PLANNING GROUP, YANKELOVICH. SKELLY & WHITE, INC., THE "INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ISSUE": THE SMALL BUSINESSMAN'S PERSPECTIVE (1985) (prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment); see also Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 4, at
129 (software designers).
12. See SPIDER ROBINSON, Melancholy Elephants, in MELANCHOLY ELEPHANTS 1 (1985)
(short story about copyright law). Over the years a number of resumes have crossed my desk that
point out with some pride that an unpublished manuscript has been copyrighted by the federal
government.
13. See RICHARD CURTIS, How TO BE YOUR OWN LITERARY AGENT 171-72 (1984).
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that event, of course, the publisher will own the copyright. Once one
has been granted a copyright by the federal government, one is entitled
to put a copyright notice on one's work, and to invoke the law's protection against plagiarism. 14
The popular picture I've sketched out has some elements that may
have derived from past copyright statutes, or from patent statutes, or
from the conflation of patent, copyright and trademark doctrine that so
pervades the popular press. 15 It may be a particularly American view of
how copyright works. It matches the current U.S. copyright system
very poorly. But there is no sense in going into the streets and announcing to the public that "copyright" is not a verb, that one cannot "copyright" something, that the federal government does not examine works
of authorship for merit or duplication; the public is unlikely to listen. 16

II.
The copyright law reflected in the current copyright statute17 goes
about things very differently from. the model I sketched out above.
Copyright vests automatically in eligible works of authorship the moment they are fixed in tangible form. 18 Its existence and ownership are
utterly independent of any office in Washington, D.C. that might regis14. I have not done the empirical research necessary to support this sketch in any systematic way, although, since the topic for this essay occurred to me, I have taken to collaring both
students and non-students and soliciting their views. In addition, I have paid careful attention to
the assumptions that seem to underlie the steady stream of copyright questions that my colleagues
supply.
15. See William Safire, On IAnguage: The Bloopsie Awards, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1990, §
6 (Magazine), at 18; William Safire, On l.Anguage: Drop the Gun Louie, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 6; Lawrence Minard, Real Estate, FORBES, Sept. 4, 1978, at 41; Jack
Valenti, Does the Letter Still Rate?: X Means Protecting Children, That's All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 1990, § 2, at 9. Mr. Valenti, for example, has repeatedly, and incorrectly, referred to the
MPAA ratings as copyrighted by the MPAA. Id. at 14. Valenti, in particular, should know better.
He not only designed the current ratings system, see id. at 19, but was also (simultaneously)
intimately involved in the drafting of the current copyright statute. See, e.g., Copyright I.Aw Revision: Hearings on S. 1361 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 278-80 (1973); see generally Litman, supra
note 6.
16. See Andrew Blum, Drug Maker Copyrights Documents, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 1991, at 3
(reporting that drug manufacturer has "copyrighted 8,200 pages" of discovery documents); Jack
Mathews, Change In Film Ratings Favored: Parents Want More Details; Producers Want Status
Quo, LA TIMES, Dec. 23, 1987, § 6, at 1 ("When the ratings were established, the MPAA
copyrighted the symbols G .•. , PG ..• , and R").
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101-810 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
18. Id. § 201. The familiar C-in-a-circle copyright notice has not been a prerequisite to
securing copyright for more than 13 years, and is now wholly optional. See id. §§ 401, 402.
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ter authors' claims;19 that office in Washington has, in any event, never
been in the business of screening works for imagination, merit or similarity to works of earlier registration. Nor are imagination, merit or
dissimilarity from prior works required. The statutory standard of originality20 demands only that a copyrightable work evince a scintilla of
creativity and be independently created, that is, not even subconsciously copied from the copyrighted work of someone else.21 If a work
of authorship is copied, even subconsciously, from other protected
works, it infringes the prior copyrights from the moment it is created,
and to that extent will be uncopyrightable. 22 If, by contrast, it has pervasive similarities to earlier works but none of them result from even
unconscious copying, the work's expression is automatically protected
in its entirety.28
The metaphysical question of differentiating independently created
expression from subconsciously copied expression deserves a literature
of its own; for present purposes, let me simply assert that the system is
not up to the task. We cannot tell the difference, but the copyright law
asks us all to behave as if we could. 2' An author who proposes to use a
copyrighted work as a building block for the work she intends to create,
or expects to rely on fragments of copyrighted expression mined from
her subconscious memory, must seek the permission of the copyright
owner or owners before she begins her work215-or so the law would
have it. As I have argued elsewhere, it can't be done. 26

III.
I expect that people who know and write about the copyright law
are well aware that the popular public conception of copyright differs
greatly from the law set forth in the statute. To the extent they practice copyright law, or offer advice to their colleagues, they know, as
19. Registration of a copyright is optional and may occur at any time during the copyright
term. See id. § 408.
20. Id. §§ 102, 103.
21. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); Litman, supra
note 4, at 974-75, 1002; Gordon, supra note 4, at 1029-30.
22. 17 U.S.C. §§ 103b, 501. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 4, at 1018-19. Copyright infringement need not be intentional to be actionable. E.g., 2 GOLDSTEIN,_supra note 1, at 161.
23. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 35-36 (1989). But see
Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988) (permitting jury to infer infringement
from pervasive similarities alone).
24. See Litman, supra note 4, at 1001-12.
25. See, e.g., 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 161-62.
26. Litman, supra note 4, at 1001-02.
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well, that the authors the statute affects are scarcely more expert than
the general population27 and are typically bemused to hear what the
law actually provides. When academics write about copyright, however,
it is standard to write.as if the authors to whom the statute speaks
knew its provisions and modulated their authorship accordingly. 28
Much of the literature repackaging copyright in theoretical terms proceeds from the assumption that authors' creation of works is influenced
by their awareness of the intricacies of the system.29 For those theorists
who model the copyright law in economic or utilitarian terms, the assumption inheres in their approach: It is difficult to speak of the incentives supplied by a legal regime without relying on the convention that
those whom the law seeks to prod are aware of the goodies that it offers
as a bribe. 30 Lockean and Hegelian theorists have less need for an assumption that authors understand copyright law,31 but have perhaps
27. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 13, at 94; 1992 SONGWRITER'S MARKET 25-26 (Brian C.
Rushing ed., 1991); Robinson, supra note 12; ERIC SHERMAN, SELLING YOUR FILM 11-12 (1990);
Safire, supra note 15. One of the most enduring myths of all, ratified by industry custom and
widespread belief but never reflected in the law, is the notion that there is some magic number of
words that may be quoted without risk of liability. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, Writers Mobilizing
Against Restrictions On Using Quotations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1991, § C at 11 (200 words);
Jonathan Yardley, The Catcher in the Right, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1987, § D at 2 (400 words).
28. See Richard A. Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law, 31 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 38 (1984); Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 209, 216 (1983); Robert Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 560 (1982); Peter Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L. REV. 715, 807
(1981); Beryl R. Jones, Copyright: Commentary-Factual Compilations and the Second Circuit,
52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 679 (1986); see also sources cited infra note 29.
29. See, e.g., 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 15-21; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Creative
Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 590, 605-26 (1987); Fisher, supra
note 1, at 1712-17, 1768-79; Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 332.
30. Paul Goldstein's recent work, however, offers a more sophisticated version of this assumption. Professor Goldstein suggests that the copyright scheme is designed to attract investment
to the production of works of authorship. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 19-20. In Goldstein's
model, diminution of the scope of copyright rights might indirectly reduce the profitability of
particular classes of works, which might discourage investment in production of works of that
class. Such an effect would not be dependent on whether authors or publishers were aware that
the copyright bundle had shrunk. Professor Goldstein nonetheless appears to rely on the assumption that authors and publishers are aware of the copyright law and can be expected to behave
accordingly. See id. at 9-10.
31. Much of this literature has focused on the supposed perception of non-authors that
rights in intangibles are prima facie illegitimate, see sources cited supra note 10, but nonetheless
has tended to assume that the authors claiming to be entitled to intellectual property rights are
aware of the content of the rights that they assert. I question w·hether the public in fact distrusts
the idea of intellectual property to the extent these writers suggest. See sources cited supra note
11. Instead, I would argue that the perception of illegitimacy to which these and other authors are
responding may be a result of the divergence between the actual law and the popular myth of
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grown accustomed to it in conceiving of copyright in terms of incentives. Indeed, a nod to economic incentives is obligatory in contemporary copyright scholarship, and the assumptions that underlie an incentive-based model have become part of the common language in which
copyright scholars speak.
Simplifying assumptions can be useful, even where, as here, they
are counterfactual. 32 When we get too accustomed to invoking such assumptions, however, we can forget to ask the interesting questions that
they assume away. Here are two: Why are authors oblivious of the
details of the copyright system? What do scholars who insist on predicating their theoretical models on the assumption that authors know
the way the copyright law operates miss about the way the law is working? It may be tempting to explain authors, ignorance of copyright
with the observation that the law is too complicated for mere mortals to
hold in their heads, but the shape of the overall copyright scheme is
surely comprehensible. I suggest that authors may cling to their version
of what copyright looks like because they like it better than ours; they
find it easier to live with. The popular myth of copyright does not intrude on the authorship process the way that statutory copyright law
does.
IV.

A composer of popular music writes a new arrangement of a popular song and then seeks to sell it to a popular performer. A jazz musician improvises a theme and variations on an old favorite. An art student completing a class assignment goes to an art museum and
meticulously copies a Picasso painting. A high school band records its
garage-practice rendition of a top 40 hit. These things happen every
day, and are all prima facie infringing.
A novelist begins a new novel; his protagonist is a professor of
literature who forges a manuscript that purports to be a lost Hemingway story. 33 A motion picture director begins shooting a new movie; in
several scenes he juxtaposes the action with images that recall the 1939
copyright, and the confused mixture of mythical and real copyright law to which people, authors
among them, are exposed.
32. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics in EssAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953), reprinted in FRANK HAHN & MARTIN HOLLIS, PHILOSOPHY AND
ECONOMIC THEORY 18 (1979); see also supra text accompanying note 6.
33. See JOE HALDEMAN, THE HEMINGWAY HOAX (1990).
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MGM classic, The Wizard of Oz. 34 A historian writes a biography of
L. Ron Hubbard, relying heavily on Hubbard's unpublished papers. 315
A Pulitzer prize-winning cartoonist draws a comic strip in which his
characters speak with Mickey Mouse about the Disney Company.36
None of these authors seeks permission before beginning work. All are
in danger of seeing their works enjoined.37
A popular songwriter creates a new song; it incorporates portions
of a prior melody that he heard but doesn't consciously recall. 36 A novelist writes a new book; it is similar in a variety of expressive details to
a book that he read a long time ago and then forgot. 39 Both become
defendants in copyright infringement suits.
The problem of unintentional or inadvertent infringement is more
pervasive, however, than these examples suggest.-' 0 All authorship is
fertilized by the work of prior authors, and the echoes of old work in
34. See GREMLINS 2: THE NEW BATCH (Warner Brothers 1990); WILD AT HEART (Samuel
Goldwyn Co. 1990).
35. See RUSSELL MILLER, THE BARE FACED MESSIAH: THE TRUE STORY OF L. RON HUB•
BARD (1987); New Era Publications Int'!, ApS. v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1989) (suit against Russell Miller for copyright infringement).
36. See Berkeley Breathed, Outland, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Oct. 8, and 15, 1989.
37. Did I hear someone ask, "But what about fair use?" Of the four works described in
text, only the biography, as of this writing, has been the subject of a copyright infringement suit.
Defendant's assertion of a fair use defense in that case was unsuccessful. See New Era Publications Int'/, 873 F.2d at 583-84. The scope of the fair use privilege is a hotly contested issue. See
Adelstein & Perez, supra note l; Fisher, supra note I; Piere N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,
40 VAND. L. REV. l (1987); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990); see also Litman, supra note 4, at 1006 n.252 (noting decreased
availability of fair use defense during the 1980s). Because authors who make use of copyrighted
works for commercial purposes must overcome a presumption that their use is unfair, see id., the
availability of a fair use defense for the conduct descri_bed in the text is far from assured.
38. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983); Fred
Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). Compare, e.g., GORDON LIGHTFOOT,
If You Could Read My Mind, on IF You CouLD READ MY MIND (Reprise 1970) with WHITNEY
HOUSTON, The Greatest Love of All, on WHITNEY HOUSTON (Arista 1985).
39. See Christopher Dickey, "Roots" Author Facing Accusations: Novelist's Suit Charges
Haley's Book is "Largely Copied", WASH. PoST, Apr. 28, 1977, at Al; Sven Birkerts, High Culture Hustler, NEW REPUBLIC, May 12, 1986, at 35 (reviewing JAMES ATLAS, THE GREAT PRE·
TENDER {1986)).
40. Cf. An Attribution and an Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1990, § 7 (Book Review), at
34:
Mr. Gillis is certainly owed an attribution and an apology. I feel this doubly so because I
have never read his book. In view of the pronounced echoes of his words in the first three
sentences of my review, it would be difficult to believe that I have not read them-or some
version of them-quoted somewhere else. Clearly they have lodged all too vividly in my
subconscious memory.

244

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:235

new work extend beyond ideas and concepts to a wealth of expressive
details. Indeed, authorship is the transformation and recombination of
expression into new molds, the recasting and revision of details into
different shapes. What others have expressed, and the ways they have
expressed it, are the essential building blocks of any creative medium.
If an author is successful at what she does, then something she creates
will alter the landscape a little. We may not know who she is, or how
what she created has varied, if only slightly, the way things seem to
look, but those who follow her will necessarily tread on a ground distorted by her vision. The use of the work of other authors in one's own
work inheres in the authorship process:0
Even more inconvenient is the fact that the creative process itself
often requires the author to forget both where she believes she has been
and where she might plan to go next.4 2 There may be authors who plan
every detail of a new work in advance before sitting down to call it into
being.43 For others, however, the authorship process consists of discovering expression than cannot be determined in advance. 44 Authors and
41. See Litman, supra note 4, at 1007-12. Copyright law attempts to manage this problem
by relying on the idea/expression distinction. In essence, a work's expression is protected by copyright, while its ideas are not. An author is, therefore, free to appropriate an earlier author's ideas,
so long as she does not reproduce that author's expression. See, e.g., 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1,
at 74-82; Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 347-53; Litman, supra note 9, at 334-36. Unfortunately, the determination of which portion of a work represents its ideas and which represents its
expression is "inevitably ad hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,
489 (2d Cir. 1960).
42. Cf. CLAUDE BONNEFOY, CONVERSATIONS WITH EUGENE IONESCO 68, 72 (1966); HAL·
DEMAN, supra note 33, at 18 (fiction):
He used his life that way. A good writer remembered everything and then forgot it when
he sat down to write, and reinvented it so the writing would be more real than the memory.
Experience was important, but imagination was more important.
Maybe I would be a better writer, John thought, if I could learn how to forget.
43. See Dreyfuss, supra note 29, at 606-14; see also Virginia Woolf, A Writer's Diary, in
THE WRITER'S CRAFT 374, 378-79 (John Hersey ed., 1974); cf. John Fowles, Notes on an Unfinished Novel, in THE WRITER'S CRAFT, supra, at 411, 412:
I suppose the orthodox method is to work out what one wants to say and what one has
experience at and then to correlate the two. I have tried that method and started out with
an analytically arrived-at theme and a set of characters all neatly standing for something;
but the manuscripts have all petered out miserably.
44. See BONNEFOY, supra note 42, at 68; EMI WADA, MY COSTUMES 147 (1989); Elizabeth
Bowen, Notes on Writing a Novel, in THE WRITER'S CRAFT, supra note 43, at 81, 82-83; Harold
Pinter, Writing for the Theatre, in NEW BRITISH DRAMA 574, 575-76 (Henry Popkin ed., 1964);
Eric Lax, Woody and Mia: A New York Story, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 30,
75; August Wilson, How to Write a Play Like August Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, § 2
(Arts & Leisure), at 5.
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artists insist that a work must find its own form;" 11 to construct a detailed edifice for a nascent work while it is still inchoate is frustrating
and futile. 46 Authors perceive that the words speak themselves, that the
characters dictate their own behavior, that shapes define themselves
and musical phrases play themselves as a work takes form." 7
The experience of authorship can make it seem as if expressive
details come out of the ether.48 That impression is largely illusion, albeit one that many authors find crucial to their craft. The words, characters, shapes and notes seem new, but that does not mean that they
come from nowhere. They have antecedents both in life and in art. 49
All authors' works echo the works of prior authors. Most of those
echoes are neither intended nor planned. 110 That does not, however,
45. See Lawrence M. Bensley, Harold Pinter: An Interview, in PINTER: A COLLECTION OF
CRITICAL EssAYS 19, 25 (Arthur Ganz ed., 1972) ("I don't know what kind of characters my
plays will have until they ... well, until they are. Until they indicate to me what they are. I don't
conceptualize in any way. Once I've got the clues, I follow them-that's my job really, to follow
the clues."); WADA, supra note 44, at 147; Peter Tauber, Monument Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 48, 52 (Architect and sculptor Maya Lin explains: "Before I touch
pencil to paper I think its very important to not find a form."); Fowles, supra note 43, at 412
("This accidentality of inspiration has to be allowed for in writing; both in work one is on (unplanned development of character, unintended incidents, and so on) and in one's works as a whole.
Follow the accident, fear the fixed plan-that is the rule.").
46. See Bowen, supra note 44, at 84; Ralph Ellison, A Completion of Personality, in THE
WRITER'S CRAFT, supra note 43, at 267, 272; Wilson, supra note 44.
47. See Ellison, supra note 46, at 272:
Once logic is set up for a character, once he begins to move, then that which is implicit
within him tends to realize itself, and for you to discover the form of the fiction, you have
to go where he takes you, you have to follow him. In the process, you change your
ideas. . . . I find that happens with me. I get to the point where something has to be done
and discover that it isn't logical for the character who started out to do it, to do it; and
suddenly another character pops up.
48. See URSULA K. LE GUIN, Where Do You Get Your Ideas From?, in DANCING AT THE
EDGE OF THE WORLD 192, 198 (1989).
49. See Litman, supra note 4, at 1010-1011; see also URSULA K. LE GUIN, Talking About
Writing, in LANGUAGE OF THE NIGHT 195, 197 (1979) ("And of course fiction is made out of the
writer's experience, his whole life from infancy on, everything he's thought and done and seen and
read and dreamed."); Bowen, supra note 44, at 83; Wilson, supra note 44; Thomas Wolfe, The
Story of a Novel, in THE WRITER'S CRAFT, supra note 43, at 400, 403.
50. See LE GUIN, supra note 48, at 193-94:
Writers do say things like "That gives me an idea" or "I got the idea for that story when I
had food poisoning in a motel in New Jersey." I think this is a kind of shorthand use of
"idea" to stand for the complicated, obscure, un-understood process of the conception and
formation of what is going to be a story when it gets written down. The process may not
involve ideas in the sense of intelligible thoughts; it may well not even involve words. It
may be a matter of moods, resonances, mental glimpses, voices, emotions, visions, dreams,
anything. It is different in every writer, and in many of us it is different every time. It is
extremely difficult to talk about, because we have very little terminology for such processes.
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mean that they reflect merely coincidental similarity. Instead, the echoes may derive from influence of works of other authors in ways that
often can be difficult to pinpoint and impossible to predict in advance.
But, as the copyright law would have it, expressive similarities between
works may follow from plagiarism or coincidence, but not from something in between. 151

V.
The models of authorship reflected in the copyright law, and in
much of the recent literature interpreting it, place the author in an
intolerable dilemma. At one extreme is the romantic model of the author, which paints each act of authorship as the conception of something new and even unique; authors create, invent, conceive. 152 Diametrically opposed to the romantic model is the rational author, who knows
the address of his muse, and cannot only identify the antecedents of his
work, but can plan his own authorship process with sufficient precision
to acquire the necessary permissions before commencing work. 153 The
first sort of author needs nobody's permission; the second sort will know
whom to ask. Authors resembling neither ideal type, however, must undertake the responsibility of securing permission from the owners of
rights in the antecedents to their works before they can know what
those antecedents are. Fortunately, there is an alternative to so impossible a task. Authors can forget the provisions of the copyright law, or
fail to learn them, and rely instead on an imaginary version of copyright that better accommodates the realities of their work.
From that perspective, the popular myth of copyright that I
sketched out earlier has marked advantages over the real thing. The
salient characteristic of the popular myth of copyright is that copyright
law does not become relevant until the point in time, prior to commer. cial exploitation, when a work of authorship is presented to the Copyright Office in Washington for a determination of copyrightability.
I would say that as a general rule ... this inceptive state or story-beginning phase ...
arises in the mind, from psychic contents that have become unavailable to the conscious
mind, inner or outer experience that has been, in Gary Snyder's lovely phrase, "composted." I don't believe that a writer "gets" (takes into the head) an "idea" (some sort of
mental object) ... and then turns it into words and writes them on paper. At least in my
experience, it doesn't work that way. The stuff has to be transformed into oneself; it has to
be composted, before it can grow a story.
51. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 7-21.
52. See Dreyfuss, supra note 29, at 607-09.
53. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 162.
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Copyright does not vest in a work while it remains uncompleted and
unexploited. Until the author stamps her work "finished" and either
sends it off to the elves in Washington or exposes it to the public, it is
not itself copyrighted and, thus, cannot infringe the copyrights in other
works. 54 Thus, while the author is actually engaged in the commission
of authorship, she need not worry about copyright at all.
VI.
What implications flow from the observation that the law that authors believe in is very different from the law on the books? At a practical level, there are few real consequences. Authors produce works of
authorship arined with faith that copyright law is as they believe it to
be, while lawyers stick around to paper over transactions that do not fit
the legal regime. 55 A work that is pervasively infringing, and thus uncopyrightable, when first fixed in tangible form can be reworked before
the public sees it. The statute might prescribe withholding protection
from much of the work because of its antecedents; a cause of action for
infringement might have already accrued, but nobody will ever know.
On a more academic level, however, the divergence between the
actual law and the popular impression of it may hold a lesson for us,
especially insofar as we are drawn to grand theory. When copyright
scholars rely on the assumption that authors know the law under discussion, their models threaten to describe a fantasy kingdom peopled
with authors who behave as no authors behave. Those models will, of
course, generate improved models and counter-models, each coherent
and a thing of beauty. Authors, unaffected by the improvements in the
theories, will continue muddling through. There is some danger, however, that the literature will describe ever more hypothetical versions of
the world. When we interpret a law that authors do not believe in
through the lens of theoretical models peopled with unreal authors who
know the law's provisions and adjust their creative output accordingly,
54. I don't pretend to defend the logic underlying this corollary, but I have heard it expressed sufficiently frequently by my colleagues, students and casual acquaintances to have concluded that its symmetry lends it substantial intuitive appeal.
55. If the substantive law were different, a satisfactory approach might be to drill authors in
the notion that they needn't worry about copyright unless they had a copyright problem, and that
they should at that point run, not walk, to a copyright lawyer. Copyright lawyers will confirm,
however, that their clients often fail to perceive that they have a copyright problem until they
have already acted in ways that prejudice their options. Much of the copyright lawyer's practice,
thus, involves devising stratagems to conform predicaments that have already arisen to the copyright statute's requirements.
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we run a risk: We may remove ourselves even further from the concrete
reality in which people who create works of authorship ply their trades.
As the literature discusses copyright as a means of encouraging authorship, the authors it invokes may become increasingly alien from real
ones.
This is not to say that the theoretical models currently in fashion
in copyright scholarship have no value. They have both grace and elegance. Indeed, the best of them are aesthetically gratifying works of
art, worthy of appreciation as sculptures in their own right. The realities they describe may be alternative realities, and they may for that
reason serve as less than useful descriptive or predictive tools for the
more mundane concrete reality, but the aesthetic beauty of Ptolemy's
geocentric theory is not significantly diminished by the subsequent discoveries of astronomy. Because the models are adroit, however, it is
tempting to ask them to deliver more than intellectual stimulation and
aesthetic satisfaction. In particular, it is easy to rely on the models generated by theoretical inquiry for implicit or explicit persuasion for normative points as well:56 And this is the point at which we should become concerned that we may only be talking with one another about
the way the law works, and should work, in a fanciful universe we have
grown inside our heads, while the law that we are discussing is working
and not working in another place entirely.
In omitting to consider whether authors fathom the substance of
the copyright law, we forget to explore the reasons that might underlie
their failure to do so. Theorists who have been mining economic, political and philosophical theory for justifications of copyright appear to
have been responding to a sense that copyright is perceived as illegitimate, somehow, and that justifications for the system need shoring
up. 157 That sense of illegitimacy may be more complicated than the
literature credits, and may be shared by authors as well as the consumers of their work.
Laws that people don't believe in suffer from an absence of legitimacy.158 The public's perception that the copyright system is, out of
whack may be more subtle and complex than a naive distrust of property rights in intangibles. The failure to believe in the copyright law (as
56. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 1766-83; Hughes, supra note 2, at 348-63; Lacey, supra
note 2, at 1584-95; Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 341-44; Yen, supra note 2, at 554-57.
57. See supra note 31.
58. See, e.g., PETRA T. SHATTUCK, PuBLIC ATTITUDES AND THE ENFORCEABILITY OF LAW
(1985) (prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment).
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distinguished from the copyright myth) may reflect something more involved than a need to be persuaded of the justice, efficiency or wisdom
of the concept of copyright. A resolution may, thus, require more than
an exhortation to moral desert, market failure, or the embodiment of
personality. The concept of copyright may not be the problem; the
problem may be instead that the particulars of our copyright system
fail to pay enough attention to the people the system seeks to affect.

